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 The book presents one perspective of cognitive science and cognitive architectures, and discusses the 
Semantic Pointer Architecture. This Architecture is built on what is called the Neural Engineering 
Framework, and can be accessed using Nengo, a downloadable software package. The software and 
overall idea are quite interesting. What is particularly valuable in it, is the ability to implement and 
run relatively complex systems based solely on simulated spiking neurons.   
The above-mentioned Neural Engineering Framework is a mechanism for translating vectors into 
neural representations. Two or more vectors can then be combined via neurally instantiated operations 
to produce an output vector.  Of particular interest is a reversible binding operator that can be used to 
combined two vectors, and then reproduce either of the inputs from the output.  Binding is a widely 
known difficulty for neural systems.  When combined with the representation of a symbol as a vector, 
the binding mechanism allows a system to implement rules, and other types of symbol manipulation. 
In other words, this is really important work, and leads to real functioning systems; the software can 
be readily downloaded and is straightforward to use. The apotheosis of the book is Spaun, a neural 
system that performs several interesting tasks, such as learning to write prototypical digits.  It is a 
system that implements several subsystems in an integrated fashion and it is the basis of the cognitive 
architecture. 
We should mention that while it is interesting to build systems from simulated spiking neurons, there 
are unacknowledged yet important shortcomings, both as a biological model of neural processing, and 
with the overall system as a neuro-cognitive model. There are two basic assumptions of the Neural 
Engineering Framework that are flawed from a neuro-biological standpoint, I believe. First is the 
vector processing mechanism, and second is binding via convolution, or indeed binding via any other 
vector combination mechanism. 
The Neural Engineering Framework assumes that the primary representation is a vector.  Elements of 
this vector are then translated into simulated neurons. This unnatural assumption or indeed 
shortcoming is referred to in the final chapter, saying "there is always the challenge of determining 
the appropriate dimensionality of the space to be presented by a population of cells." However, it is 
unlikely that the brain is actually made up vectors of orthogonal sets of neurons. Moreover, in the 
Framework, a great deal of processing is done by combining these input vectors to produce output 
vectors. This levelling is also neuro-biologically suspect. 
A second problem with the Neural Engineering Framework is binding via circular convolution. 
Binding is important to deal with the combination of symbols that humans use, for example in natural 
language, but also to combine features of objects. The final chapter states: "The particular choice of 
circular convolution for binding is difficult to directly motivate from the data." And it is. This could 
be expanded to state that there is no evidence that any vector combination mechanism is ever used to 
bind items in the brain.   
While Eliasmith notes the controversy over binding via synchrony, there is evidence for it (Usher and 
Donnelly, 1998).  Moreover, synchrony does not need to perform all of the brains’ binding tasks.  It 
may be used, for instance, for object binding (the red square task), but not for, say, complex language 
processing. Binding via synchrony can thus be available for pre-linguistic humans, and for other 
animals.  Another form of binding is via short-term synaptic changes. This is not mentioned in the 
book, and could resolve all of Jackendoff's problems, restated by Eliasmith.  However, it should be 
again noted that, unlike synchrony, but much like convolution, there is also no neural evidence for 
short-term synaptic change as a binding mechanism. 
A third problem with the approach is that learning is here an add-on. It is added as part of the move 
from the Neural Engineering Framework to the Semantic Pointer Architecture. As in reality learning 
is ubiquitous, it is constantly on, and is the real benefit to neural systems over symbolic systems, thus 
it should be central. The add-on approach is evident in the poorly acknowledged weaknesses of the 
proposed learning algorithm. Firstly, it seems unlikely that the brain relies entirely on reinforcement 
learning; there is a lot to learn, and not enough feedback from the environment required by 
reinforcement learning. The book does describe the system categorising the visual representation of 
digits; in a sense this is some kind of symbol grounding, but it has not yet learned the semantics of the 
symbols. This is the second problem, there is no sense of number, and thus no deep semantics.  In 
Semantic Pointer Architecture, indeed the symbols must be ground by the programmer. The scientific 
community is not going to be able to build a brain that does anything that is very useful. It is going to 
need to make the substrate, and have the substrate learn. 
In the biological brain, learning occurs by short-term changes in synaptic weight, longer-term changes, 
synaptic growth and death, and neural growth and death. There is some evidence that this is all 
Hebbian, but the learning rule used in the Semantic Pointer Architecture cannot accommodate all of 
these neural learning events. Of course all of this learning is poorly understood, and it is difficult to 
implement usefully. This is why the Neural Engineering Framework ignored it. By ignoring learning, 
the Framework can support standard symbolic and statistical algorithms in simulated neurons.  
Unfortunately, learning is not easily correctly added. While the Semantic Pointer Architecture does 
add a reasonable neural learning algorithm, the algorithm only accounts for simple tasks, and is at best 
an approximation of one instance of the learning algorithms in the brain.  
Neurons are powerful computational devices. They are Turing complete, which means any algorithm 
can be implemented in them. While it is interesting to run systems based entirely on simulated 
neurons, what would be important is to use neurons the way humans and other animals use them to 
implement the real cognitive architecture. 
Finally, to finish the line of criticism, the book largely ignores the large neuro-biological simulation 
literature. There are many other systems that simulate cognitive phenomena with simulated neurons 
(e.g. Rolls 2008). And much of this literature is more closely tied to data on biological neurons than is 
the work in this book. 
Overall, thus, the book lacks self-criticism, though happily criticising other approaches.  For example, 
there are the criticisms above about vectors, and binding. Another example is that the book evaluates 
the Semantic Pointer Architecture as more biologically realistic than the well-known Leabra. 
However, one may say that despite Leabra's use of rate-based simulated neurons, it is still more 
biologically realistic, because it uses a realistic topology.   
The Semantic Pointer Architecture is thus not a very solid cognitive architecture, but it is still useful.  
Cognitive architectures are supposed to provide all the essential mechanisms for cognition. But this 
architecture does not provide, among other things, a way of learning a new rule. While good 
Cognitive Architectures are not complete minds, they should be easily extendable. For example, a 
system has been implemented in Anderson’s popular ACT cognitive architecture that shows it is more 
difficult to drive while using a mobile phone. It is not clear how such a complex system could be 
developed in the Semantic Pointer Architecture. However, it is nevertheless a good thing that 
Eliasmith and colleagues are continuing to work with it. Its rule based nature, and ability to encode 
simple sensory and motor domains make it useful. It will be used for new experiments, though it will 
probably not permit as many simulations as done in ACT. 
The neural systems from the Semantic Pointer Architecture could be usefully integrated with other 
simulated neural systems; this is one of the great benefits of simulated neural systems.  Building a full 
brain is going to be difficult, and systems based on the Semantic Pointer Architecture should help 
bridge the gap from the current state of the art to eventual full brain simulation systems. 
To summarize, the book was interesting. Yet bit painful to read. There is a sound introductory 
discussion to a range of neural, cognitive, and cognitive architecture issues with pointers to relevant 
literature, but Eliasmith frequently says about other issues that "I am unaware of any literature..." 
when there is such a literature, and in some cases he either must have been aware or should have been 
aware of it.  
The book is recommended to students of cognitive architecture and neural programming, but they 
should read it with a critical eye. 
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